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1962] RECENT CASES 353
DEATH-ACTION FOR CAUSING DEATH-WRONGFUL DEATH
OF VIABLE FETUS-Plaintiff brought an action under the Kan-
sas wrongful death statute for the death of her stillborn
child as a result of prenatal injuries. The Kansas Supreme
Court held, two justices dissenting, that the parent of an un-
born, viable child may maintain an action for its death.
Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962).
At common law the right to recover damages for personal
injuries was extinguished with the death of the injured per-
son.' Under a wrongful death statute, the heirs or personal
representative of a decedent have a cause of action for his
death, if the decedent would have had a right of action for
his injuries. 3 Thus the question arises; did the viable 3 infant
have a cause of action for its injuries? The early cases held
in the negative, the rationale being that until birth an in-
fant was a part of the mother, not a separate entity, and was
unable to sue.
4
The first breakthrough came in 1946 when an infant was
allowed to recover for prenatal injuries which it suffered at
the hands of the delivering doctor. 5 Recovery is based on the
idea that a viable child is in fact a separate person and thus
would have a right to recover for prenatal injuries had it
survived.6 That there will be no remedy for the wrong should
recovery be denied is another reason advanced.7
In 1949 the Minnesota Court allowed recovery under its
wrongful death statute to, the parents of an infant that was
born dead as a result of prenatal injuries.8 This case has since
1. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178, 179 (1954)
(dictum); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229, 230 (1951)
(dictum); Drabner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921) (dictum).
2. E. g., Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-3203 (Supp. 1961) which allows
the personal representative to bring the action; Minn. State. Ann. § 573-02
(Supp. 1961) which allows the personal representative to bring the action;
N.D. Cent. Code ch. 32-21 (1961) which permits certain lineal heirs to
bring the action and if they refuse the personal representative may do so.
3. West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375, 105 S.E.2d 88, 90-91 (1958) in which
viable fetus is defined as meaning that ". . . the child has reached a stage
of development where it'can live outside the female body as well as with-
in it. A fetus generally becomes a viable child between the sixth and
-seventh month of existence."
4. E. g., Allaire v. St. Luke',s Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900);
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242(1884); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
5. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) which followed Mon-
treal Tramways v. Leville, 4 Dom. L. Rep. 337 (1933) wherein recovery was
allowed against a negligently operated tramway for Injuries sustained; ef.
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1923) (Case decided under civil law;
not reported until 1949).
6. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) overruling Stem-
mer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 684 (1942); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529. 92 N.E.2d
809 (1950); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
7. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Stipp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
8. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
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been followed by a number of other courts, 9 including the court
in the instant case, thus establishing a trend.10
There are however a number of recent decisions which deny
recovery.1 1 The theory advanced in these cases is that the
wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law
and to permit recovery is to indulge in judicial legislation.2
It is reasoned that there is no person in being at the time of
the injury to whom the defendant owes a duty of care.1" It'
has also been pointed out that if the action can be maintained,
it would necessarily follow that an infant could recover against
its own mother for injuries occasioned by her negligence
while pregnant with it. 4
The question has not yet arisen in North Dakota. It is sub-
mitted that where independent existence is possible and life
is destroyed through a wrongful act, a cause of action arises
under our wrongful death statute. This view is in accord with
a growing trend and seems to be supported by the better rea-
soning.
PAUL M. BEEKS
DIVORCE-DEFENSES-CONDONATION-THE IMPORTANCE OF
FORGIVENESS-The plaintiff, husband, filed suit for divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The defendant filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the case on the ground that the parties had
resumed cohabitation during pendency of the suit. During
this period the defendant moved her personal effects back
into the abode and the parties occupied the same double-bed
and indulged in sexual intercourse. The defendant appealed
from the court's granting of a divorce. On appeal the Florida
Supreme Court held, one justice dissenting, that resumption
of cohabitation during pendency of suit was not condonation
requiring dismissal of the suit, where the element of forgive-
ness was lacking. The dissent argued that under the circum-
stances condonation appeared as a matter of law and was re-
9. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Mitchell v. Couch,
285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d
249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
10. PROSSER, TORTS, § 36 (2d ed. 1955); 9 Kan. L. Rev. 343 (1961).
11. Norm-an v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Howell v. Rushing, 261
P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958).
12. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Ho-
gan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
13. See West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
14. Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 707 (1901) (dictum).
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